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During the American Civil War, the United States changed in dramatic fashion. The national crisis of the Civil War 
encompassed all aspects of the United States. In 1862, a forward-thinking German American intellectual named 
Francis Lieber lobbied the Lincoln administration to update the United States laws of war. On April 24, 1863, 
President Lincoln issued General Orders No. 100 or “Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United 
States in the Field.” General Orders No. 100, better known as the Lieber Code, modernized the United States laws of 
war. Not only that, but the Lieber Code traveled across the Atlantic Ocean and impacted European international and 
military law for decades after the Civil War. 
 
As a revolutionary document, the Lieber Code was an outworking of President Lincoln’s goals for the Union in the 
Civil War. The Code answered vital questions regarding emancipation and how a massive, modern, biracial, and 
volunteer army would wage a Civil War against rebellious states. The Lieber Code was often an unsung hero in United 
States history outside of legal or military history, but upon closer inspection, the Lieber Code was a window into what 
Lincoln and his cabinet believed about the Civil War. The Lieber Code embodied the answers to the moral, political, 
constitutional, legal, and international problems that the Union faced. Since the Code played such a key role in the 
Civil War, this paper investigates the historical and legal context of the Code as well as the drafting and impact of the 
Code during and after the Civil War. 
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On April 24, 1863, almost two years before the end of the 
American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln issued 
General Orders No. 100: The Lieber Code.  The Lieber 
Code’s full name was “Instructions for the Government 
of the Armies of the United States in the Field.”  Francis 
Lieber drafted the Code at the request of President 
Lincoln’s General-in-Chief, Henry Halleck, in order to 
regulate Union troops and establish doctrine on what was 
permissible in war.  The Code affected how the Union 
prosecuted the war; and, after the conclusion of the war, 
international powers used the Lieber Code as a template 
for their own military regulations.   
On a more practical scale, General Orders No. 100 was 
both an outworking of the Lincoln administration’s 
political strategy and a tool in its policies as the president 
maneuvered the Union through the complex issues of civil 
war, emancipation, and reconstruction.  In light of such a 
complex and rich history, this paper investigates the 
historical context, drafting, and content of General Orders 
No. 100.   
The American War of Independence and the American 
Civil War occurred relatively close together in the 
chronology of United States military history, ending 
within 85 years of each other.  Although the antebellum 
United States experienced political and cultural changes, 
those changes were rooted in eighteenth century 
developments and beyond.  Indeed, the War of 
Independence was the crucible through which United 
States policies and opinions on war began to crystalize. 
American colonists in the eighteenth century assumed 
that a common international law governed the nations.  
The colonists functioned from the European-Christian 
worldview that developed into what became known as 
western thought.  Prior to the development of eighteenth-
century Anglo-American international law, Europe 
grappled with the concept of warfare.  War was, by nature, 
a conglomeration of violence, chaos, ambition, and 
power; however, war was more than simple violence.  
War was a power struggle between at least two belligerent 
parties.  Christian theologians and intellectuals sought to 
understand how war was permissible in a worldview that 
valued peace, goodwill, and self-denial.  Since the ancient 
times of Abraham and the pagan kings of Canaan, the 
biblical narrative included war. 





The doctrine of “just war” developed out of this paradox.  
The rudimentary theory of just war postulated that, in 
each war, there was a belligerent side which fought for 
just reasons and another side which fought for unjust 
reasons.  The theory assumed that war was a conflict 
between good and evil.  Right and wrong were relevant 
values and if a belligerent nation was in the right, the just 
war theory allowed that nation to fight its war.  The just 
war doctrine related to the Christian notion of justified 
personal violence through self-defense.  However, the 
catch was “there could only be one just side in a war.”1  
The whole matter of just warfare hinged upon the question 
of which cause was just.  Of course, if one side was 
victorious, the victors claimed their cause as just.  
Unfortunately, if a belligerent army believed its cause was 
just, then it was unclear what limits the just war theory 
should or could place upon a military’s actions.  If both 
belligerents believed they fought for a just cause, then 
they could punish the evil actions of their respective 
opponents with military force and retribution.  However, 
if the party which perceived itself to be wronged, lashed 
out in reprisal at its antagonists, nothing restrained the 
antagonists (the original perpetrators) from retaliating at 
the retribution they received with further “justified” 
violence.  Each side believed itself to have the moral high 
ground.  Thus, any act of retribution was permissible to 
punish the opposing “evil” belligerents and to bring about 
the justice of one’s cause.  Furthermore, in the pursuit of 
justice, nearly any action was permissible so long as it was 
“necessary” to achieving justice.2  The religious wars of 
medieval Europe exemplified the dangers of such a 
theory.3 
Enlightenment philosophers recognized the danger of this 
medieval just war formula.  Witt described the 
Enlightenment diplomat Emmerich de Vattel as capturing 
the “new spirit of European warfare.”4  Vattel solved the 
dilemma of which belligerent was acting justly by 
severing the idea of justice from war entirely.  Of course, 
justice was mutually exclusive in war, and only one of the 
belligerents could have been fighting a just war.  But that 
was unrelated to the practical application of military 
power in war.  For humanity’s sake, Vattel claimed 
warring parties should set aside their convictions of 
justice and wage war according to a strict set of rules.  The 
rules which Vattel set forth confined war to a gentleman’s 
game, much like Benjamin Franklin’s comparison of war 
 
1 John F. Witt, Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in 
American History (New York, NY: Free Press, 2012), 
17.  The most important work on the Lieber Code was 
Lincoln’s Code: The Laws of War in American History, 
published in 2012 by John Fabian Witt, the Allen H. 
Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law at the Yale Law 
School.  Witt explained at great depths the traditions of 
and chess.  Vattel prescribed that war was strictly between 
the opposing combatants.  The rules restrained war from 
entering into retributive contests fueled by convictions of 
justice which descended into greater and greater degrees 
of bloodshed.  Witt described this as “moral neutrality” 
and “separating means and ends.”5  No matter how 
righteous the end, the rules of war still limited the means 
to achieving that end.   
By the eighteenth century, Europe and the American 
colonies accepted Vattel’s rules for conduct in war.  
Enlightenment humanitarian constraints on war 
established the parameters in which the infant United 
States grew up.  The doctrine of “civilized” or limited 
warfare was the foundation upon which the United States 
built its early military tradition.6   
In the American War of Independence and the War of 
1812 the United States utilized the Enlightenment’s 
humanitarian framework for war.  Military and 
international law developed in several ways in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; however, three 
key debates between Great Britain, France, and the 
fledgling United States were fundamental to the context 
of the American Civil War.  While the debates may have 
appeared to be unrelated, they impacted the Lincoln 
administration’s view of military law and formed the legal 
context in which Lieber wrote General Orders No. 100.  
The first debate dealt with free shipping, blockades, and 
international naval law.   
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the United States’ 
naval power proved insignificant in comparison to the 
European heavyweights of France and Great Britain.  
Thus, as the United States economy expanded and private 
trading vessels sailed across the globe, the United States 
turned to international naval law to protect its private 
interests abroad.  When Great Britain and France fought 
against each other, the United States attempted to tread 
the thin line of neutrality.  Britain and France routinely 
seized vessels belonging to neutral nations if those vessels 
sailed for the ports of their respective enemies.  Many 
times, those vessels were United States merchant ships.  
Denying material goods from an enemy was an excellent 
military strategy, but it did not appeal to United States 
merchants or the United States government.  The United 
States questioned what right belligerent nations had to 
seize and search ships flying the flag of a neutral nation.  
United States military and international law and how the 
Lieber Code affected those traditions.   
2 Witt, Lincoln’s Code, 17. 
3 Ibid., 16. 
4 Ibid., 16. 
5 Ibid., 18. 
6 Ibid., 19.  





Furthermore, if a nation declared a blockade on another’s 
port, it was unclear what responsibility a neutral nation 
had to recognize that blockade.    
A common saying in the United States was that “free 
ships make free goods.”  The saying summarized the goal 
of United States international policy to establish neutral 
shipping protections under international law; however, 
results were slow.  It was not until 1856 after decades of 
arduous debate, that neutral shipping and the United 
States mantra of “free ships make free goods” became 
international policy.  In the Declaration of Paris of 1856, 
Britain, France, and several other nations “pledged that 
neutral flags would cover enemy goods except for 
contraband.”7  In addition, “neutral goods were not liable 
to capture when found aboard an enemy vessel, and that 
blockades had to be ‘effective.’”8  If European nations 
went to war, international law protected neutral shipping 
and United States merchants could continue trading 
unmolested.  The Declaration required neutral ships to 
respect a blockade only if nations deemed the blockade to 
be “effective.”  The powers of Europe resolved the debate 
44 years after the start of the War of 1812.  Witt noted that 
“the neutral rights principles for which the United States 
went to war in 1812 seemed at last to have become the 
governing rules for war on the high seas.”9  However, this 
issue would surface again in 1861 with the advent of the 
Civil War, except this time the United States was on the 
opposite end of the issue.  The recognition of neutral 
shipping rights under international law, which the United 
States had fought so hard for, no longer protected the 
nation’s merchant fleet; it restricted the actions of the 
United States Navy.  
The second key debate of the 1776-1820 era centered 
around slaves in wartime.  According to Vattel’s civilized 
rules of war, armies could not confiscate civilian property.  
If armies did so, the rules of war required that armies 
compensate civilians.  American slaveowners believed 
their slaves were property.  As property, slaveowners 
claimed that the international laws of war protected their 
slaves from confiscation.  United States chattel slavery 
had the problem of identifying slaves as both property and 
people, depending on the context.  But the British military 
viewed slaves as people they should free and not as 
property they should protect.  Thus, the British military 
freed slaves and claimed their actions were in accordance 
with the laws of war.   
From 1776-1783 and from 1812-1815, British 
commanders recruited American slaves to help them in 
 
7 Ibid., 133. 
8 Ibid., 133. 
9 Ibid., 133.   
wars against the United States.  In return for helping the 
British, slaves could receive their freedom.  United States 
slaveholders protested that the British actions violated the 
laws of war.  Thomas Jefferson took such a position in the 
Declaration of Independence where he decried the British 
for “excit[ing] domestic insurrections amongst us.”10  The 
Virginia State Constitution also accused King George III 
of “prompting our negroes to rise in arms against us.”11  
Jefferson and his fellow Virginian politicians believed 
that slaves were private property and the laws of war 
protected slaves from confiscation.  Furthermore, 
Jefferson argued that it was against the rules of war for an 
invading army to incite slaves to rebel against their 
masters.  John Quincy Adams took the same position after 
the War of 1812 when he fought for British repayments to 
United States slaveholders who lost slaves in the war.  
Eventually, Great Britain capitulated to the United States’ 
demands and provided a lump sum to the United States 
government.   
The debate cemented the American tradition, in the 
Declaration of Independence no less, that the laws of war 
protected slaves as private property.  Later in his life, 
however, John Quincy Adams changed his position on the 
status of slaves in wartime.  Adams acknowledged that 
slaves did not receive special protection under the laws of 
war.  Witt explained that Adams “would decide that the 
laws of war gave armies and presidents and nations the 
power to emancipate slaves in wartime.”12  While Adams’ 
position was in the minority at the time, his opinions 
served as an omen of what was to come.   
The third and final military law issue of the antebellum 
era was how governments should treat rebellions and 
whether they should grant prisoner of war status to rebels.  
When the American colonies resisted against Great 
Britain on April 19, 1775 at the Battles of Lexington and 
Concord, the British government viewed the American 
colonists as rebels and traitors.  As such, American 
militiamen and members of the Continental Congress 
were under threat of death for treason.  During the 
American War of Independence, the British captured 
many American soldiers.  The question was whether the 
captured soldiers were traitors or prisoners of war.  The 
law stipulated that the captured rebellious soldiers were 
traitors, and that the British should execute them.  In 
reality, mass executions for traitors did not happen.  Witt 
explained that, “From the very beginning of the war, 
Washington announced his intention to treat British 
prisoners by exactly the same ‘rule’ the British adopted 
10 Thomas Jefferson, The Declaration of Independence, 
(1776). 
11 Virginia Constitution (1776). 
12 Witt, Lincoln’s Code, 78. 





for Americans in their hands.”13  Thus, the practical 
outworking of British policy toward American prisoners 
was not summary execution for treason.  While the legal 
rationale remained unclear since the Continental Army 
was a rebellious army, the actual events of the American 
War of Independence resulted in a workable solution in 
the context.  The British and American governments 
captured and exchanged prisoners during the war, much 
like two peer European nations would have done.  
Executions did take place, but those were primarily for 
spying rather than for treason.  While this option was the 
most practical path to choose for both the Continental 
Army and the British, some legal ambiguities remained.  
Nations only granted prisoner of war status to armed 
combatants who fought for another nation engaged in 
war.  Thus, by granting prisoner of war status to American 
soldiers, the British government implicitly recognized the 
Continental Congress as a legitimate government.  The 
solution to this legal conundrum was not immediately 
clear.  While the practical policy that the armies observed 
on the ground worked itself out, the unanswered questions 
would resurface in the Civil War.  
On March 4, 1861, Chief Justice Roger B. Taney 
inaugurated Abraham Lincoln as the sixteenth president 
of the United States.  The Civil War began one month 
later on April 12 when Confederate forces attacked Fort 
Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina.  With 
the advent of the Civil War, two figures loomed large in 
the development of international and military law.  The 
first was President Lincoln.  Witt explained that “It is one 
of the most enduringly striking features of the United 
States’ greatest wartime president that he came into office 
with virtually no prior experience of war.”14  But what 
Lincoln lacked in experience, he made up in aptitude.  
Although the president was ignorant regarding the laws of 
war and foreign relations, he learned quickly and 
assembled both a cabinet and a war department of 
individuals who compensated for his lack of experience.15  
With that team supporting him, Lincoln’s leadership was 
critical in establishing Union policies in the midst of a 
civil war.  Even though Lincoln may have been an 
unlikely candidate for president in 1860 and despite his 
inexperience in war, the second major figure dealing with 
 
13 Ibid., 22. 
14 Ibid., 141. 
15 Ibid., 142, 146. 
16 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard 
and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1976), 43. 
17 Aviam Soifer, “Facts, Things, and the Orphans of 
Girard College: Francis Lieber, Protopragmatist,” 
Cardozo Law Review 16, no 6 (1995): 2305. 
military law in 1861 was similarly unlikely but no less 
qualified.   
Francis Lieber was born in Berlin, Germany on March 18, 
1800.  During his lifetime Lieber fought in two separate 
military conflicts including the Battle of Waterloo and the 
Greek War of Independence.  Lieber experienced the 
horrors of war and suffered wounds himself.  The 
romantic’s glorified image of war did not disillusion 
Lieber, but he did believe that war was a stage upon which 
men demonstrated the highest values of courage and 
honor.  War was neither all victories nor all medals, nor 
an end in and of itself.  Rather, the goal of war was to 
achieve something for one’s own nation.  In this view, 
Lieber understood war to be what the military theorist 
Carl von Clausewitz defined it as.  Namely war was “a 
duel on an extensive scale,” as both groups attempted to 
exert their will on the other and “compel the other to serve 
his will.”16   
Under the pressure of an authoritarian Prussian state, 
Lieber left Europe and immigrated to the United States, 
longing to participate in United States academia.  Lieber 
was, if nothing else, a thinker and a writer.  Law professor 
Aviam Soifer stated that “Lieber was indeed always 
scrambling, always proposing projects and looking for 
work, always reading and thinking and investigating.”17  
Perhaps one of his most apparent qualities was his self-
promotion.  Lieber maintained a wide correspondence and 
became connected with several elites in the United States 
hoping to use his learning and intellect in a professorship.  
After years of searching and participating in reforms and 
projects, he received a professorship position at South 
Carolina College in 1835.   
Over the next two decades he became a well-respected 
intellectual and professor; however, he despised the 
South.  Lieber believed in the American ideals of freedom 
and personal rights, especially the right of private 
property.  He possessed strong anti-slavery opinions but 
kept them to himself.  He did own slaves in South 
Carolina but did so to assimilate into southern culture.18  
Lieber was alone and uncomfortable in the South.  
Although it was an intellectually productive time for him 
at South Carolina College, he often journeyed north.  The 
politics of higher education in a slave state placed Lieber 
18 Charles R. Mack and Henry H Lesesne, Francis 
Lieber and the Culture of the Mind: Fifteen Papers 
Devoted to the Life, Times, and Contributions of the 
Nineteenth-Century German-American Scholar, with an 
Excursus on Francis Lieber’s Grace.  Presented at the 
University of South Carolina’s Bicentennial Year 
Symposium Held in Columbia, South Carolina, 
November 9-10, 2001 (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 2005), 5.  





at a disadvantage.19  Despite his work, the college did not 
grant Lieber a promotion.  He resigned from the college 
in 1856 and moved to New York in 1857, where he 
received a professorship at Columbia College.  When the 
Civil War began, Lieber’s three sons joined the war.  
Oscar, the oldest son, served as a Confederate officer 
while Norman and Hamilton fought for the Union.  Lieber 
was 61 years old in 1861 and the aging professor longed 
to act.20  Although he could not fight, he applied himself 
to use his position as a northern intellectual to impact 
public opinion and public policy on the war, presenting 
himself and his ideas to members of Lincoln’s 
administration.  He was available for work, but the war 
began with him on the sidelines.  So Lieber lectured at 
Columbia about the laws of war and continued 
corresponding with his connections in Washington D.C. 
With Professor Lieber still teaching in New York, the 
Lincoln administration faced the issue of international 
naval law on its own.  In 1861, the War Department 
developed its strategic plan for the war.  The plan known 
as the Anaconda Plan called for the military and economic 
constriction of the South.  The plan required the closure 
of all Confederate ports on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, 
which created problems with Europe.  Great Britain and 
France both had economic interests in the South, with 
their textile industries connected to the cotton empire of 
the South.  European interests created a complicated 
minefield that Lincoln’s secretary of state, William 
Seward, had to step through.  At first, Seward toyed with 
the idea of declaring the southern ports closed, but 
European statesmen rejected this notion.21  If the Union 
wanted to close its ports, it would face strong European 
opposition, which was something the Lincoln 
administration could ill afford.  If the Union chose that 
course of action, Europe would either submit to the 
closure and lose economic profits or recognize the 
Confederacy as an independent nation and treat the ports 
as open.22  The latter option would have been disastrous 
for the Union.   
Seward also proposed a blockade.  As in 1812, the United 
States Navy was small in 1861—too small to create an 
effective blockade.  However, given enough time, the 
Union could create a fleet large enough to constrict the 
Confederacy.  A blockade would also deflect European 
opposition because international law recognized 
blockades and Great Britain had political interests in 
maintaining the power of the navy.23 But, in order to 
 
19 Mack and Lesesne, Francis Lieber and the Culture of 
the Mind, 5. 
20 “Would to God”: Francis Lieber to Henry Halleck, 
February 9, 1862, as cited in [John F. Witt, Lincoln’s 
Code: The Laws of War in American History (New 
York, NY: Free Press, 2012), 179]. 
establish a blockade and implement the Anaconda Plan, 
the Lincoln administration had to resolve the issues raised 
by the 1856 Declaration of Paris.   
President Lincoln’s policy declared that seceded southern 
states were still a part of the Union.  Disloyal rebels had 
simply taken over the Confederate state governments.  To 
resolve the conflict, the Union needed to defeat the rebels 
and reconstruct loyal state governments in place of the 
disloyal ones.  However, if the seceded states were still 
within the Union, the United States would have to 
blockade its own ports in order to implement a blockade, 
which violated international naval law.  In addition, the 
1856 Declaration of Paris required nations to recognize a 
blockage only if it was effective.  Thus, in order for the 
Union to close southern ports and for the Anaconda plan 
to work, the United States Navy had to establish an 
effective blockade over thousands of miles of coastline 
with an inadequate fleet all while unlawfully blockading 
its own ports.24  Despite the inconsistencies of blockading 
its own ports, the United States government blockaded 
them anyway.  Many argued that the blockade declaration 
recognized the Confederacy as a belligerent party to the 
conflict and thus an independent government.  While 
these arguments had implications upon Lincoln’s long-
term position of rebellious state governments within the 
Union, in the short term it allowed him to implement an 
effective strategy against the Confederacy.  Declaring the 
blockade allowed the Union to limit the flow of material 
goods into the South while preventing European 
interference in the Civil War because the blockade was a 
policy that European powers knew and respected from the 
Declaration of Paris.25  Ultimately, the Navy became large 
enough to establish an effective blockade by the end of 
the war.   
With the naval issue politically resolved, the Lincoln 
administration implemented the Anaconda plan.  As the 
land war commenced, more issues began to develop.  
Finally, the German born professor from New York was 
able to lend a hand.  Lincoln had to face a similar question 
to the one which had plagued the British military in 1776.  
It was unclear whether the Union could capture 
Confederate troops as prisoners of war without 
recognizing the legitimacy of the Confederacy or if 
international law required the Union to treat Confederates 
as traitors and separate from the laws of war.  Some 
people argued that the if the Union did recognize 
Confederate troops as prisoners of war, the captured 
21 Ibid., 143. 
22 Ibid., 143. 
23 Ibid., 144-145. 
24 Ibid., 145. 
25 Ibid., 146. 





troops could be immune from charges of treason.  
Additionally, as the Union army advanced southward, 
runaway slaves began coming to Union lines.  Some 
Union generals turned the slaves away, unwilling to 
challenge the personal property rights of southern 
slaveholders.  Others treated the slaves as free in a type of 
preliminary emancipation.  Seward and Lincoln had 
created a workable (though not legally watertight) 
solution to the naval law questions.  Professor Lieber 
helped to answer the other two questions in the trifecta of 
international military law: slavery and captured rebels.  
In February 1862, Union and Confederate forces clashed 
at Fort Donelson, Tennessee.  Lieber heard that the 
Confederates had wounded his son, Hamilton, during the 
battle and so Lieber travelled west to find his son.  While 
searching for Hamilton, Lieber met Henry Halleck, the 
Union general in command of the Department of the 
Missouri.  They developed a close friendship which 
would be advantageous for Lieber in the months ahead.  
In July 1862, Lincoln appointed Halleck to be his 
General-in-Chief in Washington.  As General-in-Chief, 
Halleck addressed many of the legal questions the Civil 
War raised about military law and corresponded with 
Lieber regarding some of the issues.  Biographer Lewis 
Harley stated that “[Lieber] was frequently called to 
Washington for consultation in the War Department.”26  
In the summer of 1862, General Halleck commissioned 
Lieber to research the use of guerillas in war and write a 
proposal for how the United States should deal with 
Confederate guerillas.  Lieber’s argument created helpful 
distinctions between classes of combatants and Halleck 
strongly approved of his work.27   
Lieber proposed to Halleck on multiple occasions that the 
Union needed a strong codification of its policies and the 
laws of war.  The War Department had often constructed 
its policies as the war progressed through the changing 
landscape of Civil War military law.  Many times, Union 
generals adopted contradictory policies, such as the 
policies regarding runaway slaves.  Lieber argued “that 
the President ought to issue a set of rules and definitions 
providing for the most urgent cases, occurring under the 
Law and Usages of War, and on which our Articles of 
War are silent.”28  In his biography of Lieber, historian 
 
26 Lewis R. Harley, Francis Lieber: His Life and 
Political Philosophy (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1899), 148. 
27 Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth-Century 
Liberal (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1947), 329. 
28 Lieber to Halleck, November 13, 1862, as quoted in 
[Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber: Nineteenth-Century 
Liberal (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University 
Press, 1947), 331].   
Frank Freidel further elaborated that Lieber wanted the 
President to “appoint a committee to draw up a code 
defining the acts or offences and in some instances stating 
the punishment under the laws of war.”29  Lieber was 
correct that a code would be valuable, but another reason 
existed which Freidel did not mention when he discussed 
the reasons for drafting a code.  In addition to the apparent 
need for a general codification to the laws of war, 1863 
witnessed dramatic changes in the nature of the Civil War.   
On January 1, 1863, President Lincoln issued the 
Emancipation Proclamation which declared all slaves in 
Confederate held territory to be free.  In April 1863, 
African American men were serving in the Union army as 
combat infantrymen.  The inclusion of African American 
men in the military as combat units carried massive 
implications.  The South refused to recognize African 
American men as real soldiers and did not grant them 
prisoner of war status.  The Union had to respond when 
Confederate forces refused to grant prisoner of war status 
to African American troops and commenced selling the 
captured soldiers into slavery.  Thus, although the Lieber 
Code was about military law and the conduct of United 
States armies in the field, it was also about slavery and 
Lincoln’s war goals.  When the Civil War began, 
Lincoln’s primary goal was to preserve the Union.30  But 
after January 1, 1863 emancipation became the other 
prominent war goal.  When Lincoln expanded his war 
goals to include emancipation, the second war goal 
pointed to what the war had always been about, namely 
slavery.   
Historians have debated the “genesis” of Lieber’s Code 
and attempted to determine what Lieber’s governing 
principle was when he wrote the Code.  John Witt and 
historian Matthew Mancini argue that slavery and 
emancipation were prominent factors in Lieber’s 
motivations.31  Other historians point to the preeminence 
of preserving the Union or how the challenges of war 
made the Code necessary.  Historian D. H. Dilbeck 
disagreed with Witt and Mancini when he said 
“Emancipation-related concerns neither preoccupied 
Lieber throughout the war nor primarily motivated him to 
draft his code.  He did not set out on a grand effort to 
reenvision the laws of war for the age of emancipation.”32  
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Dilbeck went on to explain, “Lieber drafted General 
Orders No. 100 in response to the ‘confusion of ideas’ 
about the laws of war revealed by how Federals handled 
the issues of prisoner exchanges, guerrilla warfare, and 
the parole.”33 
While different historians qualified Lieber’s motivations 
and emphasized one motivation over the other, the 
Professor spoke for himself.  Mancini cited letters where 
Lieber described his motivations to be on both sides of the 
debate. 34  Lieber never said that the two motivations were 
mutually exclusive.  He could and did combine multiple 
motivations into his passion for the Code.  Perhaps one 
motivation was primary in his mind.  In the language of 
the Code, “To save the country is paramount to all other 
considerations.”35  Regardless of the supremacy of his 
goals, Lieber did have more than one goal when he set out 
to write Union military regulations.  Historian Richard 
Shelly Hartigan balanced the issue well when he said 
Lieber had a “desire to see his adopted country at peace, 
unified, with all its members free” and “he set aside the 
first of these goals to secure the latter two.”36 
Thus, in order preserve the Union, ensure a free nation, 
and return to peace, Lieber sought a military code of 
conduct which preserved the Union, achieved peace 
quickly, and applied to biracial armies.  He had to 
establish codes for how the United States would view its 
soldiers, white or black, and how the United States would 
expect its enemies to do the same.   
In December of 1862, Halleck invited Lieber to come to 
Washington to join a committee to create a code for the 
United States Army.  Lieber created the rough draft, and 
after suggestions & revisions by the committee and 
Halleck, the president approved the Code and issued it 
from the War Department as General Orders No. 100 on 
April 24, 1863.37  Lieber titled the Code “Instructions for 
the Government of the Armies of the United States in the 
Field.”  Because of his initiative and primary authorship, 
the Code was known as Lieber’s Code.  When Lincoln’s 
administration issued the Code, it represented the Union’s 
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position on key matters regarding how it viewed and 
fought the war.  However, in writing General Orders No. 
100, Lieber not only codified the Union’s positions on key 
questions regarding slaves in wartime and who were 
prisoners of war, but also established a new philosophy 
regarding war and a prescriptive code which reflected that 
philosophy.  Witt argued in his book Lincoln’s Code, that 
the Code should be “better thought of as Lincoln’s.”38  
Witt took this position because “the Union’s instructions 
[rose] out of the crucible of slavery” and “it was Lincoln’s 
Emancipation Proclamation that required its production 
and sent it out into the world.”39  Lincoln provided the 
leadership and change which created the context of 
emancipation.  Lieber was responsible for codifying the 
ideals of emancipation within the military regulations.  
Thus, although Lieber was the author of the Code, Lincoln 
played a foundational role in its creation.  
Lieber wrote the Code in 157 short articles that described 
what military law allowed and did not allow in war.  
Equally important, however, was the fact that Lieber 
included the rationale behind each prescription or 
prohibition in the Code.  Lieber divided the Code into ten 
sections.  Each section dealt with a specific category of 
military law.   
Section I addressed martial law, military jurisdiction, 
military necessity, and retaliation.  The section was vitally 
important for three reasons.  First, Lieber laid out the three 
principles which governed military power: justice, honor, 
and humanity.40  War was a competition between powers 
that could be brutal, but the Code required nations to wage 
war justly, honorably, and humanely.  Second, Lieber 
defined the most important factor to examine in war.  In 
Article Five he wrote “To save the country is paramount 
to all other considerations.”41  This statement was a strong 
reflection of Lincoln’s first war goal to save the Union.  
Third, in Articles 13 through 16, Lieber described the test 
of military necessity.42  A military action was necessary if 
37 Richard R. Baxter, “The First Modern Codification of 
the Law of War: Francis Lieber and General Orders No. 
100,” International Review of the Red Cross 3, no. 25. 
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it achieved the goal of preserving the Union or “sav[ing] 
the country.”43   
Lieber’s doctrine of military necessity received criticism 
in the nineteenth century.  Law professor Burrus 
Carnahan, in his article reviewing the doctrine of military 
necessity, described how the Confederacy condemned the 
doctrine of military necessity because it could be “a 
License for Mischief.”44  The Confederacy feared that any 
Union military action would be justifiable because it was 
“necessary.” Carnahan described how this happened in 
World War I when Germany used the doctrine of 
necessity to justify its actions; however, Carnahan noted 
that “Lieber’s principle of military necessity had evolved 
there into the doctrine of Kriegsraison, which permitted 
the German army to violate many of the laws and customs 
of war on the basis of military necessity.”45  Carnahan’s 
point was that, even if the Confederacy condemned the 
doctrine of military necessity and the German army 
abused it, that was not the original intention of Lieber’s 
Code and his view of military necessity.  The principles 
of justice, honor, and humanity governed military 
necessity.  Military necessity must and could not have 
been a blank check for an army to take whatever action it 
desired.  On the other hand, military necessity did mean 
that war could and would be violent and tragic.  Lieber 
believed some things in war were never necessary 
because they were not just, honorable, or humane.  Such 
things included the use of torture and poisons.46  But other 
times, some things were necessary, as long as they were 
just, honorable, and humane.  The ultimate concern was 
to win the war.  Lieber’s conclusion to Article 29 followed 
this logic when he wrote the remarkable words, “The 
more vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for 
humanity.  Sharp wars are brief.”47 
Section II dealt with the protection of private property and 
private persons as well as public works of art and science.  
Lieber mandated the protection of private property even 
in war, but there were two important exceptions.  The first 
was if military necessity required the seizure of private 
property.  The second was if the private property was a 
slave.  In that case, Lieber made a strong defense which 
drew heavily from Lord Mansfield’s decision in Somerset 
vs. Stewart in 1772 which established that only positive 
law could hold a person as a slave and once that person 
reached free land (or free jurisdiction under the United 
States military), that person was free, and no one could 
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return them to slavery.48  This argument was a powerful 
tool to carry out Lincoln’s second war goal of 
emancipation.  Under Section II, any slave who fled to the 
United States Army was thereby free. 
Section III handled deserters, prisoners of war, hostages, 
and booty on the battlefield.  The key articles built on the 
emancipation argument of Section II and stated that “The 
law of nations knows of no distinction of color, and if an 
enemy of the United States should enslave and sell any 
captured persons of their army, it would be a case for the 
severest retaliation, if not redressed upon complaint.”49  
The statement protected the African American soldiers in 
the Union military and gave the War Department power 
to address the actions of the Confederacy.   
Section IV codified the War Department’s policy on 
guerilla warfare and the different categories of 
combatants which Lieber had submitted to General 
Halleck in 1862.  Section V established rules for spies, 
traitors, and those who otherwise acted outside of the 
realms of justice, honor, and humanity.  The latter 
category included belligerents who abused flags of truce.  
The Code dealt with anyone who violated those principles 
in the strictest terms.  Section VI elaborated on prisoner 
exchange, flags of truce, and flags of protection.  Section 
VII clarified prisoner exchanges by outlining the Union’s 
position on parole.   
Section VIII listed rules for armistice and capitulation.  
Section IX outlawed assassination.  Like poisons and 
torture, assassination was illegal in war.  Section X 
defined insurrections, civil wars, and rebellions.  It was 
worth noting that, although each of the three definitions 
were distinct, the Code defined the secession of the South 
and the American Civil War, as an insurrection, civil war, 
and rebellion simultaneously.  Article 149 stated, 
“Insurrection is the rising of people in arms against their 
government, or a portion of it, or against one or more of 
its laws, or against an officer or officers of the 
government.”50  Article 150 defined civil war as “war 
between two or more portions of a country or state, each 
contending for the mastery of the whole, and each 
claiming to be the legitimate government.”51  According 
to Article 151, rebellion was “applied to an insurrection 
of a large extent, and is usually a war between the 
legitimate government of a country and portions or 
provinces of the same who seek to throw off their 
46 Executive Order 100, sec. I, art. 16. 
47 Ibid., sec. I, art. 29. 
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allegiance to it, and set up a government of their own.”52  
Under Section X of General Orders No. 100, the 
Confederate States were guilty of all three charges. 
Article 155 and Article 157 were the two final articles of 
importance in Section X.  Article 155 divided the United 
States’ enemies in war into combatants and non-
combatants.53  The Code stipulated that, while they were 
both enemies, the Union army should not treat both 
classes the same.  There were special protections for both 
as according to their actions.  However, it is imperative to 
note that non-combatants were not simply non-
combatants.  They were non-combatant enemies.  The 
Code defined both combatants and non-combatants as 
enemies.  Because non-combatants were enemies, the 
Code included them in the general sufferings of war.  
According to General Orders No. 100, the enemy was not 
solely the infantryman across the field, but the enemy was 
also the farming family who supported the soldier from 
the home front.  In order to save the country, the Union 
had to defeat both.  Lastly, Article 157 stated that “Armed 
or unarmed resistance by citizens of the United States 
against the lawful movement of their troops, is levying 
war against the United States, and is therefore treason.”54  
The final article of the Code established that resistance by 
a citizen of the United States was unlawful and treason.  
On April 24, 1863, Lincoln issued and distributed the 
Code to both the Union army and the Confederacy.  
Harley described the Code as “obligatory upon all the 
armies of the United States.”55  The immediate impact of 
the Lieber Code upon the Civil War was that it established 
the Union army’s policies on how it would fight the war.  
The Code impacted prisoner exchanges, provided a 
standard for Union soldiers’ behavior, and defined the 
enemy and who would or would not receive certain 
privileges such as prisoner of war status.  Law professor 
Jordan Paust stated that “The Code undoubtedly lessened 
human suffering during the Civil War, and it formed an 
authoritative exposition of the laws of war for prosecution 
of soldiers and civilians then and for years to come.”56  In 
the bloodiest war in United States history, anything which 
limited human suffering proved a praiseworthy 
accomplishment.   
When Lieber wrote General Orders No. 100 in 1862-
1863, it served as a seminal work.  Historians from the 
twenty-first century had the difficult task of endeavoring 
to enter into Professor Lieber’s context and accurately 
discern what his intentions were in writing the Code.  The 
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context of two world wars, a cold war, and a war on terror 
could tempt twenty-first century historians and lawyers to 
glorify the humanitarian aspects of Lieber’s Code.  It was 
true that General Orders No. 100 did place some 
remarkable restraints on the United States army.  
However, the same man who wrote the General Orders 
No. 100 also advocated for a fierce, “sharp war.”57  It was 
imperative that lawyers, politicians, historians, and 
military service members understand the proper context 
of the Lieber Code and not overemphasize either the 
humanitarianism or the ferocity of the Code in an 
imbalanced manner.  Harley wrote his work on Lieber 
prior to the First and Second World War.  Harley 
published his book the same year as the first Hague 
Convention in 1899.  His perspective on General Orders 
No. 100 was helpful to understand the Code from a 
nineteenth-century context.  Harley wrote, “Throughout 
the code, two leading ideas prevail; the one, a desire to 
save even our enemies from unnecessary injury and 
destruction; the other, the necessity of displaying the 
greatest energy in the conduct of war, so as to speedily 
bring hostilities to an end, and restore conditions of 
peace.”58  Lieber himself balanced both Vattel and 
Clausewitz.  According to Hartigan, he remedied the “gap 
between theory and practice” that Vattel and Clausewitz 
each presented in turn.59   
From the strategic perspective, the Code laid forth a just, 
honorable, and humane path through war that sought to 
limit unnecessary suffering and preserve human life and 
culture.  At the same time, however, the Code embodied 
a belief that war had a goal, and nothing was more 
important that accomplishing that goal.  For Lincoln, that 
primary goal was preserving the Union.  After January 1, 
1863, the second goal was to emancipate slaves.  The 
Code enabled the Union army to fight for both of those 
goals.  If a military action was necessary to accomplish 
those goals and it was just, honorable, and humane, it was 
legal in war.  The Code did not sanction unnecessary 
suffering.  But the Code did allow for hard, sharp, extreme 
suffering if it was necessary.  Lieber argued through the 
Code that sharp (or harsh) wars were short, and short wars 
were more humane because they reduced overall 
suffering.  
Politically and militarily, the Code helped the Lincoln 
administration pursue a vigorous policy of reunification 
and emancipation.  The Code proved an essential key in 
protecting the African American soldiers of the United 
States Army.  While the Code did not prevent horrible acts 
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of violence against African American soldiers, it was still 
an integral part of Union military policies.  By having a 
clear published standard of how the Union army and its 
enemies should act, the Union could punish any violations 
of those standards according to a predetermined code.  
The Code laid out the path by which the Union could and 
would retaliate against illegal acts in wartime.  Thus, 
while the Code did not physically protect African 
American soldiers, it gave the Union the legal 
ammunition to respond to its policies of utilizing African 
American soldiers in combat.  
Socially, the Lieber Code redefined the status of former 
slaves, at least while they were in the army.  The scheme 
of master-slave race relations no longer defined African 
American men.  If they were in the army, they were 
soldiers, although not yet fully equal to white soldiers.  
Another cultural impact of the Lieber Code was that it 
further strengthened the position military law had in 
United States constitutionalism.  United States 
constitutionalism sought to protect liberty while 
restricting power, and military might was the epitome of 
power.  The Lieber Code enabled a vigorous military to 
take the necessary actions to save the country, while 
simultaneously restraining that power under the 
Commander-in-Chief and the United States Constitution.   
The effects of General Orders No. 100 did not restrict 
themselves to the United States.  Internationally, the 
Lieber Code was the foundation to several aspects of 
military law through the Second World War.  Several 
European nations adopted the Code or versions of it as 
their military regulations.  The Code’s stipulations on 
acceptable war tactics influenced international law such 
as the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  However, 
Paust reminded historians that the Code did not apply 
solely to international warfare.60  In addition to 
international wars, the Code applied to civil wars, wars of 
insurrection, and United States conflicts with Native 
Americans.61  Thus, the influence of Lieber’s Code 
reached much further than either international wars or 
civil wars.   
Ultimately, the Code was not only a codification of rules 
of war.  Lieber and Lincoln together redefined the way 
western culture thought about war.  Vattel’s idea of a 
morally neutral war did not apply to the American Civil 
War.  Law professor David Kennedy stated that “Vattel 
wrote for those, like Franklin, who aspired to be wise 
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statesmen for nations participating in an established 
international order – not those who wished to 
revolutionize that order.”62  The Civil War was an 
unorthodox war between a Union and rebellious 
insurgents within it, rather than between two independent 
nations. 
For Lincoln, the Civil War was a just war, and he could 
not separate justice from the goals he pursued.  He 
believed that preserving the Union was a divine task.  
Lincoln fought the Civil War on moral terms; however, 
he did not revert to the early European notion of just war 
which Vattel had rejected.  Lincoln would not say he was 
absolutely justified in his moral position.63  Lincoln 
claimed that only God knew what was the right course of 
action, but as best Lincoln knew, he was doing what was 
right and thus, he decided to press forward to achieve his 
goals.64  Witt succinctly described Lincoln’s vision as an 
attitude of “resolve and humility.”65  President Lincoln 
said it best; “With malice toward none; with charity for 
all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the 
right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind 
up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have 
borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to 
do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting 
peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.”66  That was 
the true legacy of the Lieber Code.  Captain James Garner 
stated that “the moral and humanitarian principles” of the 
Code “balance the notions of military necessity and those 
of humanity in order to (1) protect both combatants and 
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering, (2) safeguard 
fundamental human rights of those who fall into the hands 
of the enemy, and (2) facilitate the return of peace.”67  
With these three goals in mind, the Lieber Code 
represented harsh justice, yet, other times, considerate 
humanitarianism.  The Code focused on the goal of 
preserving the Union; its true vision, however, was lasting 
peace.   
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